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Page 2 >> 1 By Andy Bochman
In fact, it feels a little more special when we gather inside a larger conference context, which without a doubt is what you get at the mighty annual DistribuTECH, which took place this year in sunny San Antonio, Texas.
So, enough chit chat. Let's dive into what was discussed on Thursday morning by these folks. Moderator Mike Ahmadi of GraniteKey expertly led a panel of experts on the topic of security standards, including:
· Bobby Brown, Enernex
· Alan Rivaldo, Texas PUC
· Nate Kube, Wurldtech
· Darren Highfill, Man of Many Hats
The guys covered several different topics in depth, including security metrics, vulnerability handling in IT vs. OT, social engineering, and perhaps, most provocatively, security information disclosure ethics and ramifications. Below find a few highlights for each one:
Metrics and measurement
· In the shadow of Basecamp (which we'll get to shortly), trying to gauge industry progress on security or lack thereof, Mike asked: "are products getting better?" and the response surprised some of us I think. Nate, who has been testing grid products and systems since he was knee high said "absolutely!"
· Others chimed in that, slowly but surely, increased awareness has raised the bar for what's expected from vendors. Sometimes it's because utilities' RFPs' demand it, other times it comes from the vendors themselves. Altogether it's certainly too slowly for many of us, but the consensus seemed to be: tangible improvement is happening out there
· Darren introduced the new DOE RMMM (in early development), referenced other maturity models and frameworks, and he and the panel seemed to contend that all of these, to a greater or lesser extent, help organizations baseline and roadmap their security functions and goals ... and who wouldn't want that!
· Bobby Brown got some laughs (from me, anyway) when he likened the concept of security maturity standards for SG products to the carnival sign we all know that says "You must be this tall to ride this ride"
· Nate praised an audience member's phrase: "at the speed of Metasploit". This set the stage for the later discussion on disclosure. (There's more on the Metasploit vulnerability and exploit development framework HERE if this is your first time hearing the term.)
· Much to my delight, much was said about metrics and measurement in the early going, as we moved back and forth between contrasting the development and evolution of standards and guidelines (e.g., NERC CIPs, NISTIR 7628, IEC 62443 2-4, etc.) with demonstrable improvement in the security posture of utilities
Vulnerabilities in IT vs. OT
This may be obvious to many folks, and I've heard it mentioned quite a bit myself especially concerning meters. But the point was made that in the IT universe, one of the primary modes for dealing with newly surfaced vulnerabilities as well as new types of threats, was rapid change. Rapid change of hardware (we all want the latest gadgets, laptops and servers) is facilitated and driven by customer expectations a refresh on these items every few years or so.
And we see even more rapid change in IT software, as patches to some systems are generated once a month, once a week or pretty much any time. We not only tolerate this pattern, we've come to expect it as a natural part of using the latest and greatest (and safest) software.
That of course brought us back to the OT part of our world, and its intrinsically different set of economics, values and certainly, hardware and software lifecycles. For many good reasons, the systems that support our operations centers, generators, transmission and distribution functions, to include both the hardware and the software, have simply not been built to accommodate frequent change.
And the culture which wraps around these systems, both the users and the suppliers, is still largely hard-wired to make decisions based on comparatively very lengthy spans of time elapsing between changes.
According to Darren, factors that play into the longer OT hardware and software version lifecycles include:
· How a system is built
· How systems around that system are built
· How we use these systems
And a question arose: are systems that are being designed today looking like they're more able to facilitate faster change cycles? Don't think we arrived at an answer on that ... and that means the answer might be "no."
Page 2: Social engineering >>
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